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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

FAY WALKER OSMUS, .
Plaintiff and Respondent,

CASE

vs.
HARRY OSMUS,
Defendant and Appellant.

NO. 7152

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff as respondent herein commenced the above
entitled action in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, against the
defendant on the 14th day of March 1947 praying for separate
maintenance; pursuant to stipulation entered by attorney for
plaintiff and defendant the court made and entered its order
herein requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum
of $25.00 per week as temporary support money commencing
on the 15th day of July 1947 and to pay to her attorney the
sum of $50.00 on or before the 1st day of August 1947, pending
said action.
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On July 21, 1947, the defendant filed his answer and cross
complaint in said action praying for a divorce and praying the
court enter an amount for the support of his children and for
general relief.
On August 24 ,1947 the plaintiff filed an amended complaint setting forth some additional facts, but still praying for
a decree of separate maintenance and support money, attorneys
fees, a general accounting of his earning and for general relief.
On October 7, 1947, the plaintiff then filed her second
amended complaint, in said action praying for a decree of
divorce, custody of the three minor children; for the sum of
$250.00 per month for the support of said children and herself
and for her court costs herein and for general relief.
On the same day the defendant filed in said action his
written entry of appearance and waiver, consenting that the
court m.ay enter his default in said action provided the court
would not grant a sum in excess of $250.00 per month for
alimony and support money, and on the same day the court
heard said matter and the default of the defendant was entered
by the court and the decree _of the court was then entered,
wherein the plaintiff was granted an interlocutory decree of
divorce, the custody of three minor children with right in the
defendant to visit with said children at reasonable times. The
decree further provided that the defendant was to pay to the
plaintiff the sum of $100.00 per month as alimony, and the
sum of $50.00 per month for each of the said minor children
and that the first payment of $250.00 was to be paid within
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ten days from the entry of said decree and that the court retain
jurisdiction of said matter for all purposes.
. Since the entry of the order of the court on the 15th day
of July 1947, requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
the sum of $25.00 per week as temporary support money, and
the entry of the decree of divorce on the 7th day of October
1947, requiring the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum
of $250.00 per month as alimony and support money, the
defendant has paid to her the sum of $50.00, (Tr. 7).
On the 18th day of December 1947, the court entered its
order herein requiring the defendant to appear in court on the
22nd day of December 1947, at the hour of 10 o'clock A. M.
on said day to show cause, if any he has, why the court should
not make and enter its order herein punishing the defendant
for contempt of court fo~ his wilful failure to comply with
the decree of the court, and why he should not pay to the
plaintiff what is due and owing to her under the terms of said
decree and for attorneys fees. That said order was issued
pursuant to the affidavit of the plaintiff (R-39) stating that
the defendant had paid her nothing but $50.00 since the 15th
day of July 1947! that he was able-bodied and steadily employed and capable of complying with the decree of the court.
In answer thereto the defendant filed a petition for modification of decree, (R-42) stating among other things that he
was not able to pay the sum of $250.00 or anything in excess
of $25.00 per week at a later date.
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On the 22nd day of December 1947 a hearing was had
on the issues involved, and the court made and entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law and order in said
action, finding the defendant in contempt of court for his
wilful failure to comply with the decree of the court and pronounced judgment upon him that he be confined in the County
Jail for a period of 25 days (R-46 to 49), from which order
the defendant appeals to the Supreme Court.
ARGUMENT
The only argument the defendant contends for is that he
was not able to comply with the order of the court in the payment of $250.00 per month to the plaintiff and he has, in his
brief, set forth several cases that hold in substance that:
"Under the authorities cited and the uniform holdings
of the courts, it is prerequisite in contempt proceedings
of the nature here under review to an order committing
to jail that the one charged should be found able to
comply with the court's order, or that he had intentionally deprived himself of the ability to comply with such
order."
Hillyard vs. District Court, 68 Utah, 220. 249 Pac. 806.
With the foregoing doctrine the plaintiff agrees, but it is
the contention of the plaintiff that the defendant "had intentionally deprived himself of the ability to comply with such
order.''
The defendant testified that up to the 15th day of February
1947 he was working for D. F. Anderson making as high as
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$800.00 per month (Tr. 4) when he lost his job.

Since that
time he states he has not worked except for a Mrs. Carlson at
63 73 So. State St., and that he was working for her since May
1947, for his board and room. He was living at Mrs. Carlson's
in Sandy, Utah (Tr. 2) (Tr. 4 & 5). Defendant further testified that he had been keeping company with Mrs. Carlson before and after his divorce (Tr. 7). Upon redirect examination
the defendant was asked: (Tr. 21) "Isn't it a fact you are more
interested in Mrs. Carlson here than you are in her business or
your future welfare?" Answer: "Yes, sir." He further testified that he is capable of making $8.00 a day as a Fry Cook but
that he would work for Mrs. Carlson for his board and room
because she promised him an interest in her business (Tr. 10)
(Tr. 6). They had not been making any money in this business and in fact running behind (Tr. 6) and yet he was satisfied to go along with Mrs. Carlson and let her keep him by
furnishing him board and room rather than get out and work
for himself or for his family. He was able-bodied and capable
of working, except he states that he was temporarily disabled
because of his shoulder (Tr. 11). He was content to let his
wife and three children, one of whom is an invalid (Tr. 26)
live on relief and let the County Welfare Department take
care of them (Tr. 22) and to further work for his board and
room so that he could be around the woman he cares for,
rather than do anything for his wife and three children. Defendant further testified that he had made no effort to find
work in Salt Lake because he had outstanding bills against
him and he was afraid his creditors would be after him (Tr.
5) . He was not interested in his forme~ wife, the plaintiff, or
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his children. He made no effort to even see them although
he was given the privilege of visiting with the children at
reasonable times and had not seen them since July 1947
(Tr. 20).
The plaintiff and defendant had a substantial interest in
a fine home which the plaintiff was compeled to sell in order
to save the equity they had in it (Tr. 23). She recovered
$5,000.00 on it. She spent some $3,000.00 between the time
she sold it and the time she purchased an equity in another
home on which she paid $2,000.00, all the money she had left.
The defendant contends she had sufficient money to live on
and that apparently was an excuse for him not to pay her anything. She testified she was under heavy expense and had to
spend some $3,000.00 for the support of herself and children
which the defendant contends is unwise and extravagant. She
explained what she did with this money (Tr. 24). She had to
have a home for her children and she did the best she could with
what she had. The defendant rendered no help to her or his
children or to provide a home or support for the children and
now he complains of her extravagance. Let him try to keep
three minor children, some of whom were sickly and invalid,
living at a hotel and paying medical care for them and see if
he could do better with the money she had. We think this
is no excuse for his failure to offer some supervision for his
children and their welfare. He merely told her she could live
on that (Tr. 26) and made no further effort to help her.
The defendant cites the case of Selph vs. Selph, 231 Pac.
921, Arizona in the following language:
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"The law does not require impossibilities, but it does
exact good faith and an honest and conscientious effort
to perform its orders and decrees.
It has been held too that an inability to pay alimony
brought about by the defendant's own act for the purpose of avoiding its payment may be punished for
contempt.''
and justifies himself by saying that it was impossible for him
to comply with the decree of the court. We may agree that
he could not pay the money to. the plaintiff when he would not
work, but we certainly do not agree that he was acting in good
faith and an honest and conscientious effort to perform its
orders and decrees and we further contend that his inability
to pay the money to the plaintiff was brought about by his own
acts for the purpose of avoiding its payment. Defendant's own
testimony and demeanor before the court bears this fact out
and it was, without doubt, the reason the court held the defendant in contempt of court.
In the defendant's assignment of error No. 2 he contends
the court should have modified the decree by reducing the
alimony and support money because of the defendant's inability
to pay same and has cited a number of cases in support of this
contention.
We agree that the law he cites is good law but not applicable to the instant case. The decree in this case was entered
by the court upon the stipulation of the defendant that the
court award not more than $250.00 per month; $100.00 as
alimony and $50.00 per month for the support of each child.
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The court had a perfect right to assume the defendant was
able to pay this on his own stipulation (R. 27) and the fact
that he had been making $800.00 per month. The court had
nothing further before it. If he was able to pay this out of his
ability to earn such an income, $250.00 was not excessive for
a wife and three children, who needed the constant care of
their mother. The defendant now comes before the court
and contends that he cannot make that and that he signed the
stipulation and waiver upon the advice of his attorney. This
appears to be a flimsy excuse at this time. That matter should
have been raised before the court made its findings of fact and
decree in the main case.
Our courts have repeatedly held that:
·'To entitle a party to modification of a decree there
must be change of circumstances. Chaffee vs. Chaffee,
63 U. 261, 225 Pac. 76.
and the court has upheld this strictly in a number of cases, some
of which are as follows:
Carson vs. Carson, 87 U. 1. 47 Pac. 2nd 894.
Cody vs. Cody, 47 U. 456. 154 Pac. 952.
Sandall vs. Sandall, 57 U. 150, 193 P. 1093.
Tribe vs. Tribe, 59 U. 112, 202 Pac. 213.
There was no change of circumstances in this case. If
anything, the changed circumstances were on the part of the
plaintiff wherein she was worse off than when the decree was
entered. I do not think it is necessary to go into this matter
further for the reasons mentioned herein and the law in such
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cases. An action in equity may be the proper procedure in
such a case to show that the decree was inequitable and
impossible of performance, but to attack the matter by a petition to modify where no changed circumstances exists since
the entry of the decree is unjustifiable and we think the ruling
of the court in denying this modification was entirely justified.
Herzog vs. Bramel, 23 Pac. 2nd 345 at 347.
We think the plaintiff in every essential has complied with
the law in bringing this proceeding before the court by the
facts that she sets up in her allegations contained in her affidavit (R. 39) and in the findings of fact and conclusions of
law and decr~e of the court (R. 46 to 49) in accordance with
the law in Parish vs. McConkie 35 Pac. 2nd 1001 and in accordance with the following:
Herzog
court held:

t-'S.

Bramel, 23 Pac. 2nd 345 at 347, wherein the

"Under the statutes and codes sililar to ours, we think
it is generally recognized that the enforcement by citation or an order to show cause or by contempt proceedings, or orders or decrees with respect to the payment
of monthly or other specific periods of alimony and
counsel fees, for a failure and a wilful refusal to pay
the same, is one of the inherent equity powers of the
court.
Had the plaintiff by her petition merely averred the
existence of the decree, the allowance of alimony,
counsel fees, and costs, the ability of the defendant to
comply therewith, demands made of him to do so, and .
his failure and wilful refusal to comply therewith,
without averring or referring to the alleged fradulent
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and void contract or settlement entered into subsequent
to the decree, and by citation or order to show cause or
by attachment of the person of the defendant sought
the enforcement of the decree, the jurisdiction of the
court to entertain the petition and proceed with the
cause rnay not well be doubted.''
all of which we think the plaintiff has complied with and the
findings of the court that the defendant herein was able to
comply with the court's order, or that he had intentionally
deprived himself of the ability to comply with such order, was
justified, and the order of the court finding the defendant in
contempt of court and the imposition of sentence should stand.
Respectfully submitted,
BENJAMIN SPENCE,

Attorney for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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